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Summary. - Social movements have been viewed as vehicles through which the 
concerns of poor and marginalized groups are given greater visibility within civil 
society, lauded for being the means to achieve local empowerment and citizen 
activism, and seen as essential in holding the state to account and constituting a 
grassroots mechanism for promoting democracy.  However, within development 
studies little attention has been paid to understanding how social movements can 
affect trajectories of development and rural livelihood in given spaces, and how 
these effects are related to movements' internal dynamics and their interaction 
with the broader environment within which they operate.  This paper addresses 
this theme for the case of social movements protesting contemporary forms of 
mining investment in Latin America.  On the basis of cases from Peru and 
Ecuador, the paper argues that the presence and nature of social movements has 
significant influences both on forms taken by extractive industries (in this case 
mining), and on the effects of this extraction on rural livelihoods.  In this sense 
one can usefully talk about rural development as being co-produced by 
movements, mining companies and other actors, in particular the state.  The terms 
of this co-production, however, vary greatly among different locations, reflecting 
the distinct geographies of social mobilization and of mineral investment, as well 
as the varying power relationships among the different actors involved. 
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Andes 
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1. INTRODUCTION: MINING EXPANSION AND SOCIAL 
MOBILIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The 1990s saw significant shifts in global investment flows in mining, an effect of 
changes in national regulatory frameworks in over 90 countries worldwide (Bridge, 2004; 
Holt-Giménez, 2007).  One of the many consequences of these changes has been that an 
increasing share of investment has flowed to South America.  Between 1990 and 2001 
twelve of the twenty-five largest single capital investments in mining were made in South 
America, two in Peru, nine in Chile and one in Argentina (Bridge, 2004: 412, 413).  Four 
of the top ten target countries for mining investment were Latin American: Chile (ranked 
1st), Peru (6th), Argentina (9th) and Mexico (10th).  Chile and Peru have been particularly 
favored by neo-liberal reforms, receiving more investment than might otherwise have 
been predicted on the basis of their geological attributes alone (Bridge, 2004).  Such 
surges and shifts in global investment geographies are mirrored at a national level.  In 
Peru, for instance, by 2000 three departments2 had between 30 and 50 percent of their 
terrain under mining claims, and a further seven had between 20 and 30 per cent (Bury, 
2005).  Claims are particularly concentrated in highland departments characterized by 
historically neglected agrarian economies and significant indigenous and campesino 
populations.   
 
Accompanying this growth in investment in extractive industries has been an equally 
remarkable surge in social mobilization and conflict (Bebbington, 2007a, b). For 
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example, in 2005 a report to the Peruvian Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office) 
recorded thirty-three separate conflicts related to mining (Ormachea, 2005).  The nature, 
scope and extent of this mobilization and these conflicts vary across space, however, as 
does the mineral investment itself.  Indeed, the intersections of these two distinct 
geographies – one of investment, the other of social mobilization – goes a long way in 
determining the uneven geographies of the relationship between mineral development 
and patterns of rural territorial change.   
 
This observation is the starting point for this paper.  We explore the claim that the 
level and nature of social mobilization elicited by the presence of mining investment 
serve as critical intervening variables in the relationship between investment, rural 
development and livelihoods.  Posing and exploring this claim is a potentially fruitful line 
of enquiry that offers the prospect of complementing existing literature on rural social 
movements in which relatively little attention has been paid to the question posed in this 
paper – namely the roles of rural social movements in mediating the effects of large scale 
capital investment on rural livelihoods and territorial change.  The question is also 
important for discussions of rural territorial development (RTD) that have gained 
increasing prominence in multilateral agencies (Schejtman and Berdegué, 2003).3  At its 
core, the argument for RTD emphasizes that rural development requires both productive 
and institutional modernization, as well as conscious efforts to articulate these 
modernization processes with a conception of space that recognizes linkages between 
urban and rural economies, between on and off-farm activities and between socially 
constructed ideas of territory and administrative conceptions of territorial governance.    
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At the same time as serving as an analytical framework for understanding the 
relationships between economic transformation, institutional change and livelihoods in 
given rural spaces, RTD also has a more normative edge as a policy lens for fostering 
forms of rural development which connect economic growth with institutional 
arrangements and ensure that the rural poor are able to participate in this growth process.  
However, the role of conflict in affecting these relationships has received less attention 
than has the role of collaboration and coordination.  To focus on the effects of social 
mobilization on relationships between mining and rural development might therefore 
contribute to deepening reflection on the role of conflict in RTD.    
 
With these antecedents, the paper proceeds as follows.  The first section outlines 
elements of a conceptual framework for exploring possible links between political and 
economic context, livelihoods, RTD and social mobilization.  This serves as a basis for 
the research questions that underlie the empirical analysis.  The second section presents 
the contexts of each case study, one from Peru and the second from Ecuador, while the 
third analyses the relationships between mining investment, social movements and RTD 
that have occurred in each case.  The final section offers a comparative analysis of these 
two cases, and suggests both movement and contextual factors that determine the effects 
that social mobilization has on processes of RTD. 
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2. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND THE CO-
PRODUCTION OF TERRITORY 
 
In this section we suggest possible relationships between the political economy of 
RTD and forms of social mobilization.  The case studies in the following section will be 
discussed in the light of these possible relationships.  In particular we suggest that social 
mobilization can be understood as a response to the threats that particular forms of 
economic development present, or are perceived as presenting, to the security and 
integrity of livelihoods and to the ability of a population in a given territory to control 
what it views as its own resources.  We also suggest that the extent to which this 
mobilization modifies subsequent economic development depends greatly on the relative 
power of movements and economic actors (in this case mining companies).  This relative 
power is determined partly by the roles assumed by other actors (in particular the state) 
and to a great extent by the relative strength or weakness of the social movements 
themselves.  The second subsection considers in more detail some of the factors and 
relationships internal and external to movements that might determine their relative 
strength.   
 
a) Livelihoods, dispossession and social mobilization 
 
Livelihoods are a function of assets and structures, and a source of subsistence, 
income, identity and meaning (Bebbington, 1999; Moser, 1998; Scoones, 1998).  Some 
social movements seek to expand people's asset bases.  Others, however, emerge to 
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contest patterns of resource control and access, and to challenge the institutions, 
structures and discourses that determine the social distribution of assets, as well as their 
relative productivity, security and reproducibility (Bebbington, 2007b).4  Indeed, the 
emergence of movements might be understood in terms of their relationship to two 
distinct types of accumulation: "accumulation by exploitation" and "accumulation by 
dispossession" (Harvey, 2003).  The former, workplace centered form of accumulation 
has historically generated labor movements, trade unions, and related political 
organizations.  Conversely, "resistance to accumulation by dispossession (as with the 
'privatization' of land and water) has tended to take the form of ‘new’ social movements, 
around issues such as land and minority rights" (Hickey and Bracking, 2005: 853).   
 
In this reading, resistance is understood as a defense of livelihood, in which 
movements emerge to protect assets by challenging the structures, discourses and 
institutions that drive and permit exploitation and dispossession.5  At the same time, 
threats to livelihood might also elicit mobilization motivated by the cultural and 
psychological losses that might arise when livelihoods are disarticulated (Bebbington, 
2004).  Habermas has argued that social movements are apt to emerge when people's 
lifeworlds – their domains of everyday, meaningful practice - are "colonized" by forces 
which threaten these lifeworlds and people's ability to control them (Habermas, 1987; 
Crossley, 2002).  In the face of this colonization, he suggests that social movements 
emerge to defend and recover threatened forms of life and social organization (a similar 
view to that of Escobar [1995: 222-226], even if the theoretical basis is distinct).  While 
Habermas was more interested in the role of the modern, bureaucratic state in this process 
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of colonization, the incursion of new forms of investment in rural environments, the 
accelerating effects of cultural modernization on traditional practices, and the 
disarticulation of existing moral economies (Scott, 1976; Edelman, 2005; Ballard et al., 
2005) might similarly be understood as colonizations of the lifeworld.   
 
When movements have emerged to contest the development of extractive industries, 
they might be understood in these terms: as vehicles for contesting both the colonization 
of lifeworlds and the material threats to livelihood that flow from Harvey's two processes 
of accumulation.  Historically, the strongest movements around mining have emerged to 
address issues of exploitation: for example, the mine workers union in Bolivia, on the 
strength of whose mobilization a large part of Bolivia's 1952 revolution was crafted 
(Nash, 1993).6  Such workplace mobilizations continue today – as in the protests during 
2006 around workers compensation and benefits at the BHP Billiton-owned La 
Escondida mine in Chile (BBC, 2006).7  However, as technology increasingly substitutes 
for labor, formal employees become more skilled, and low-skill employees are recruited 
on short-term contracts, so conflicts between mine and labor unions have steadily become 
less likely and more localized than was the case in earlier decades.8  At the same time, 
however, technological changes have turned many once uninteresting mineral deposits 
into technically exploitable and commercially viable propositions.  As part of this 
process, open-pit techniques have become progressively more important.  These 
techniques greatly increase the surface footprint of the mine.  As a result of these 
different technological changes, the potential frontier for mining has been pushed deep 
into areas already occupied by humans as well as into new drainage basins and areas of 
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already threatened ecologies.9  This brings new threats to the material and cultural bases 
of livelihood in these and adjacent10 areas, eliciting new types of movement – ones that 
contest issues of dispossession and colonization rather than workplace conditions.   
 
The dispossession threatened by this new mining takes various forms.  The most 
obvious is the dispossession of the land under which minerals are deposited.  Here 
movements protest against loss of territory and forced land sales at low prices.  A second 
is the dispossession of the resources themselves, where movements protest the loss to 
private (generally foreign) capital of what they perceive to be a national asset.  In each of 
these instances, dispossession is a question of loss in both the quantity of people's assets 
(land, water courses, grazing, and minerals) and the quality of these assets (water and air 
pollution).  Dispossession might also be understood as loss of a way of life, and a certain 
set of taken-for-granted assumptions about livelihood and development.  Finally, 
dispossession can be understood as the loss of exchange value that occurs through the tax 
and royalty exemptions that companies enjoy at a time of rising commodity prices.   
 
While movements might share a broad concern about dispossession in a general 
sense, there can still be considerable diversity among and within movements as to the 
specific types of dispossession they are contesting.  Likewise, different actors within 
movements may offer distinct critiques of the issues that they are addressing, and 
different proposals for alternative policies (cf. Perreault, 2006).  These alternatives can 
range from complete rejection of resource extraction and these new modes of resource 
governance, through to demands for greater participation in decision-making regarding 
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resource management and more equitable distribution of the economic benefits derived 
from resource exploitation.  Some groups within movements might be open to deal with 
resource extraction companies, others not at all (and vice versa).  Some may prefer 
strategies of negotiation, others of confrontation and direct action. 
 
These differences have implications for how we conceptualize movements and 
understand their relative coherence.  They also have implications for the influences that 
movements may have on patterns of territorial development in mining affected areas.  We 
might hypothesize that the positions and strategies that dominate within movements will 
have distinct implications for the types of negotiation and articulation that ultimately 
occur between movements and resource extraction industries, and thus for the types of 
development that ensue from these articulations.  At one extreme one can imagine the 
existence of movements with unified and forceful positions reflecting their sense that 
they are being dispossessed both of a way of life and of exchange value, and who are 
unwilling to negotiate.  When successful, such movements can prevent extractive 
industries from operating.  However, when confronted by an equally intransigent mining 
company and a state willing to sanction the use of force, such movements are likely to be 
unsuccessful and ultimately repressed and destroyed.  At another extreme one can 
hypothesize movements whose concern is to negotiate compensation for dispossession 
and/or guarantees against dispossession of asset quality and who would withdraw 
contestation once the mining company had put in place plans for environmental 
remediation and social compensation. When successful, such movements are able to 
negotiate favorable compensation for a broad base of their membership; when 
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unsuccessful, the leadership of such movements can be corrupted or be manipulated into 
clientelistic relationships in which they ultimately gain little more than trinkets in return 
for acquiescence.  Among these different options, the type of articulation that ultimately 
occurs depends much on the relative strength of movement and mining company, the 
vulnerability of movement leaders to cooptation, state postures regarding mining 
development, freedoms of association and the right to protest, and on the positions 
assumed in these conflicts by public authorities, NGOs, churches, the media or Chambers 
of Commerce.  
 
b) Sources of strength and fragility in social movements 
 
Social movements fail to deliver on their agendas as often as they succeed.  This 
propensity to failure reflects an inherent fragility in movements, one that has to be 
understood in terms of their internal dynamics and of the contexts within which they 
operate.  How far movements are able to manage and overcome their inherent fragilities 
goes a long way in determining how far their presence will influence patterns of RTD and 
livelihood change. 
 
We take the notion of social movement to refer to processes of collective action that 
are sustained across space and time, that reflect grievances around perceived injustices 
and that constitute a pursuit of alternative agendas (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Escobar, 
1995).  These processes are frequently multilocational and sometimes transnational, and 
are sustained more by shared grievances and discourses than by any clear form of 
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articulating social structure.  In this sense, movements are much more than individual 
organizations.  However, organizations are an important part of movement processes.  
Indeed, movements frequently depend on formal organizations – in particular because 
their actions require financial, human, informational, social and other resources that more 
localized and/or informal social networks are unable to mobilize (Crossley, 2002; 
McAdam et al., 1988, 2001; Ballard et al., 2005: 627; Andrews, 2001).  Such resources 
can almost only be channeled by formal "social movement organizations," SMOs 
(McCarthy y Zald, 1977) – organizations such as NGOs, churches, student bodies, formal 
peasant or ethnic associations, university groups etc.  Furthermore, just as movements 
might be multilocational and transnational, so these SMOs may also exist at a range of 
geographical scales.  This is certainly the case in contemporary movements contesting 
extractive industries.  Even when their campaigns are focused on territorial 
transformations in a given location, these movements often bring together local, national 
and international actors (cf. Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  Such actors play an important role 
in keeping movements "moving" - by maintaining debates, supporting events nurturing 
leaders and sustaining networks during those periods when movement activity has slowed 
down.   Such organizations also play important roles in forming movement discourses, 
although if different SMOs have distinct ideas of how movement discourse should evolve 
they can end up pulling a movement in different directions (c.f. McCarthy y Zald, 1977). 
 
Movements are thus constituted by distinct currents, groupings of actors, local 
leaderships and SMOs.  This breadth is both a source of weakness (because of the 
tensions and coordination problems it can lead to) and of power (because it increases the 
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reach and geographical presence of movements).  In particular, given the different ways 
in which groups might understand and be aggrieved about dispossession, and the distinct 
views they may have on what ought to be done to remedy such dispossession, holding a 
movement process together around a shared agenda and vision is an immensely difficult 
feat and always a fragile achievement. 
 
These internal sources of weakness can be compounded by external factors.  In 
particular, while many livelihoods might be threatened by mineral development, others 
will stand to gain, some quite significantly as mineral development creates new 
livelihood opportunities.  These opportunities may be created through local sourcing of 
supplies and services, through increasing levels of demand in the local economy fostered 
by mine staff expenditure, through companies' social responsibility programs or through 
fiscal transfer programs (Barrantes, 2005).  Within a given territory, then, the growth of a 
mining economy changes the opportunity structure for a wide range of livelihoods, with 
some seeing opportunities where others see dispossession. 
 
These quite differing views of the role of the mine in improving livelihoods can easily 
lead to situations in which the social mobilization that emerges to contest mineral 
development exists alongside quite distinct forms of mobilization that seek to defend and 
support the mine (and that may well receive direct support and encouragement from the 
mining company itself).  Very often, these two, quite distinct types of mobilization enter 
into open conflict.  The recent history of Perú has many examples of this phenomenon 
and it is present in both our cases.  For instance, in 2005, at the same time that local and 
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national movements were criticizing the Australian company BHP Billiton for the 
adverse effects of its Tintaya mine (in the department of Cusco), Tintaya's own 
employees marched in the cities of Cusco and Arequipa in support of the mine.  More 
recently (August/September 2006), employees of Minera Yanacocha in Cajamarca, Peru 
(one of our cases) marched through the city in opposition to the community groups, 
NGOs and civic associations that were criticizing the mine. 
 
To the extent that such pro-mine mobilization exists – or at the very least that there 
exist a significant number of livelihoods benefited by the growth of a mineral economy – 
then the fragility of social movements becomes even more of a constraint on the extent to 
which their presence will affect patterns of territorial change.  Critical here is the relative 
power of these different actors, and the relative importance of the extractive industry 
within both the national and territorial economy.  Where the industry is that much more 
important, one would expect state and other social forces to be more determined to 
question, delegitimize and repress movements and more generally expose their internal 
fragilities.  Likewise the greater the resources at the disposal of other economic actors, 
the more able they will be to deepen the inherent fractures in movements.  At a more 
general level of abstraction, in this triad of relationships among movement, business and 
state, it may well be that the outcome of conflicts – and thus of the types of RTD 
processes triggered by mining activity – hinge around how far state agencies ultimately 
identify with one set of claims over another.  The position taken by the state depends in 
turn on the relative importance of mining in the national economy and the effectiveness 
with which it itself is lobbied by pro- and anti-mine lobbies. 
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3. CASE STUDIES 
 
To explore these questions, this study deliberately selected two sites in which the 
outcomes of mineral development projects had been radically different, yet which shared 
similar time lines and even a number of key social actors.  The rationale for this choice 
was that the comparison would enable identification of core differences between the two 
experiences that might help explain these distinct outcomes.  This would help the study 
draw attention to factors that have a causal effect on the ways in which social movements 
and mineral development interact with each other and ultimately influence patterns of 
territorial development. 
 
The first of the two cases comes from the department of Cajamarca in the Northern 
Peruvian Andes.  More specifically we consider the case of the Yanacocha mine whose 
operations are located in the high Andes some 35 km. to the North of the city of 
Cajamarca in an area of traditionally peasant populations organized in communities11 
(Figure 1).  The mine – which we refer to as MYSA12 - is jointly owned by Newmont 
Mining Corporation (a US based multinational with head offices in Denver, Colorado) 
with a 51.35% share in the ownership, the Peruvian Compañía de Minas Buenaventura 
with 43.65%, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) with 5%.  MYSA is a 
particularly significant mine, not only because it is the largest gold mine in Latin 
America, but also because it was the first large scale foreign direct investment in Peru 
following the decade of the 1980s lost to hyperinflation and civil war.  While exploration 
was underway during the 1980s, the first significant investment was made only in 1992 
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and the first gold presented to the public in 1993.  While initially the company insisted 
that the mine would be small, it has grown steadily ever since and currently MYSA 
employs some 8000 workers (only 2,243 of whom are regular staff).  In the first half of 
2006 the Central Reserve Bank of Peru estimated that MYSA's sales reached US$936.5 
million, and in 2005 the mine produced 3.3 million ounces of gold, 45 per cent of 
national gold production.13 
Figure 1: Yanacocha and Cajamarca  
 
Source: Bury 2004 
The second case comes from the county (canton) of Cotacachi, located some two 
hours' drive to the North of Quito, Ecuador and covering both high altitude grassland 
(with a dominantly Quichua population) and humid tropical valleys (with a colonist and 
mestizo population).  This humid sector, known as Intag, is also the site of a copper 
deposit commonly referred to as the Junín deposit (Figure 2), and identified during the 
1980s under a geological exploration agreement between the Ecuadorian and Belgian 
governments.  In 1990 the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) financed 
more thorough exploration by the Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) that 
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confirmed the existence of a large and potentially profitable deposit.  In 1993 the 
exploration of the deposit passed to the company Bishi Metals, a subsidiary of 
Mitsubishi.  However, Bishi Metals abandoned the site in 1997 as a result of escalating 
conflict and the concession remained idle until 2002 when it was once again purchased.  
By 2004 the concession had been acquired by Ascendant Copper Corporation, a "junior" 
mining company incorporated in British Columbia, Canada,14 and in 2005 Ascendant 
transferred ownership of the property to its subsidiary Ascendant Ecuador (Ascendant 
Copper Corporation, 2005).  Though still not developed, this will – like Yanacocha – be 
an open-pit mine.  Unlike MYSA, however, this (potential) mine operates in a context in 
which mining is still unimportant in the national economy, in which there is little history 
of mining, and in which the economy – though far from dynamic – is not emerging from 
a collapse of the type that occurred in Peru in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Figure 2: The Junin copper deposit in Cotacachi  
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
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Both Cajamarca and Cotacachi have become important and emblematic sites in 
Peruvian and Ecuadorian debates over the relationships between extractive industries, 
rural development and social conflict.  Both promised in their early years to help re-
dynamize (in the Peruvian case) or dynamize (in the Ecuadorian case) moribund mining 
sectors, both are open-pit projects located in hydrologically sensitive areas, both involve 
deposits in already occupied and farmed land, and both have elicited processes of social 
mobilization that have become important within wider national environmental 
movements questioning extractive industries.  In each instance: the mining industry has 
argued that external, politically motivated elements are to blame for these levels of social 
mobilization; local actors have developed links with international actors, in particular 
those linked to the networks of Friends of the Earth International and Bay Area 
environmental groups; mobilization has led to acts of violence against property and 
persons; national human rights groups and indigenous peoples organizations have 
become involved; the local conflicts have become a topic in the respective national 
media;15 and central government agencies have been drawn into the conflicts.  
Furthermore, partly reflecting the presence of international networks (c.f. Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998), the processes of social mobilization in the two sites have over time 
become linked, with exchange visits and sharing of information among activists and 
organizations working on the two cases.16  And yet, the investment dynamics and 
processes of territorial change could hardly have been more distinct.  Today, MYSA 
reaches across 10,000 ha of the Cajamarcan highlands, an extension exceeding that of the 
city of Cajamarca,17 while the Junín mine in Cotacachi is still no more than a base camp 
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and an imagined project.  Cajamarca's regional economy has been transformed by 
MYSA, whereas Cotacachi's revolves around other economic activities. 
 
These following two case studies ask how such radically different processes over 
the same 15-20 year period might be explained, and how much of this difference is due to 
the processes of social mobilization that have emerged in the two sites?   
 
 
 
 
a) Cajamarca: multiple mobilizations and mining-led territorial transformation 
 
The acquisition of land is central to the success of an open-pit mine for the obvious 
reason that such operations require that the mine own surface as well as sub-surface 
rights.  Land, however, has long been a point of political contention in the Andes and, 
indeed, MYSA's land acquisition program triggered the first rumblings of discontent with 
the mine.  Interestingly, however, the rumblings were less due to asset loss per se, but 
rather the conditions under which land was being acquired.  Complaints began to emerge 
about prices paid, undue pressure exercised on families to sell their land, people selling 
land to the mine that belonged to absent owners rather than them and inflationary 
pressures in the local land market.  The first stop for these complainants was the parish 
church in the area most affected by the early activities of the mine.  The priest served to 
link the complaints up with the Diocesan human rights office as well as other human 
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rights organizations in Peru – organizations which in turn presented the complaints to 
MYSA as well as Newmont headquarters in Denver.   
 
While the local Church played the initial role in linking communities up to proto-
social movement organizations, this soon came to an end when the priest was sent to 
Rome.  At this point, however, another actor began to assume this articulating role.  This 
actor was the nascent federation of rondas campesinas, peasant vigilante groups whose 
primary purpose had been to guard against cattle rustling and later assure community 
security more generally during the times of rural violence in Peru (Starn, 1999).  A 
number of people active within the federation were affected by the expansion and land 
purchasing activities of the mine, and the federation became a vehicle for contesting these 
adverse impacts (Chacón Pagan, 2005).  The federation (FEROCAFENOP) began to 
organize protests in Cajamarca itself and further developed its links to international 
environmental groups (in particular in the Bay Area of the US)18 – links that also helped 
it engage in advocacy in the US.  In the process, their complaints became more visible 
nationally and internationally, although federation activists of this period remember it as 
one when international support and involvement was far greater than support from urban 
Cajamarca for whom these rural grievances passed as largely invisible and irrelevant.  
Significantly, though, notwithstanding the grievances that peasants and the Federation 
had with the mine, the protest during this period was not so much oriented towards 
getting rid of MYSA19 as to demanding a different relationship between mine and 
communities: a relationship characterized by fair compensation, more civil treatment, and 
greater participation in the benefits that the mine was generating.   
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As the process of organization and mobilization was underway in Cajamarca, a 
similar process was occurring at a national level (de Echave and Pasco-Font, 1999) – a 
reflection of the rapid increase in mining investments and conflicts during the mid- and 
late-1990s.  This process culminated in the creation of a National Coordinator of Mine 
Affected Communities, or CONACAMI in Spanish (de Echave and Pasco-Font, 1999).  
Activists in Cajamarca were an important part of this process, and initially the idea was 
that the Federation of rondas would be the Cajamarca branch of CONACAMI.  However, 
a series of conflicts between different interest groups, party political currents and leaders 
(locally and nationally) meant that this alliance was short-lived, and CONACAMI was 
never able to establish a significant base in Cajamarca.  Meanwhile, the struggles 
between different leaderships both within and among organizations in Cajamarca began 
to weaken both the Federation and the more general process of social mobilization. 
 
Meanwhile, concerns about the mine were beginning to grow in the city of Cajamarca 
– not so much because of any sympathy with the plight of rural communities but rather 
because of the accumulating evidence that the mine was beginning to have adverse 
effects on the quality of the urban water supply (Ecovida, 2005; Seifert, 2003).  A 
mercury spill from a mine truck in the village of Choropampa in 2000 further 
consolidated these concerns while also gaining far greater international attention because 
of a highly successful video (supported financially and distributed by several 
international SMOs) that documented the spill and gave visual form to the less than 
sensitive ways in which both mine and government responded to the complaints and 
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mobilization of Choropampa's residents.  Urban environmentalist groups that had begun 
to emerge at around the same time found themselves somewhat strengthened by these 
events, as did the coordinating group that had begun to work across these different 
organizations. 
 
Around the same time as these publicly visible environmental failures of the mine, 
MYSA finally succeeded in channeling some its social responsibility program finance to 
FEROCAFENOP,20 the federation that had for so long been the main organized face of 
rural contention against the actions of the mine.  When this became publicly known, the 
legitimacy and power of the federation rapidly weakened (and any remaining links with 
CONACAMI were cut by CONACAMI).  As a direct consequence, the anchor of the 
social movement around the mine quickly shifted from rural to urban organizations, and 
from organizations based in rural community groups to ones based in urban intelligentsia 
and professional groups.  In the process, movement discourses also began to change.  
While the rural movement of the 90s had been openly confrontational, it had been neither 
an environmental movement nor an anti-mining movement.  Instead it had been a 
movement that was more concerned to demand fair treatment and adequate compensation 
for the forms of dispossession that had occurred in rural communities, and a fuller 
inclusion of rural people in the mine's activities.  In this sense it might be argued that it 
sought a far clearer and more synergistic articulation of the mining economy and rural 
livelihoods – rather than the enclave and dispossession model of mining that dominated 
in the 1990s.21  With the shift to an urban-led movement, the movement discourse 
became increasingly a mix of environmentalism and/or of calls for greater national and 
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state participation in both the governance of the mine and the control of its profits.  The 
politics of peasant protest (both populist and radical) were increasingly crowded out by 
those of an urban environmental left characterized by its own internal differences on the 
place of mining in the regional economy.  This is not to say that peasant protest and 
mobilization disappeared – indeed, it continued to play an important part in future 
conflicts with the mine (see below).  However, the actors who increasingly defined the 
debates within which these protests were interpreted were urban – intellectuals, NGOs, 
occasionally local authorities.22 
 
Environmental concerns remained at the forefront of debate in Cajamarca during the 
early 2000s, as arguments emerged about whether mercury had seeped into the urban 
water supply or not, and over whether the overall quantity of this supply was being 
threatened (Ecovida, 2005).  At the centre of this latter discussion was an argument about 
MYSA's desire to expand operations into an area known as Cerro Quilish.  Initial peasant 
protests against this expansion in the late 1990s had ultimately led to a municipal 
ordinance that declared Quilish a protected area on the grounds that it was the source of 
the cities' water supply.  The ordinance was, however, contested by MYSA, and after 
drawn out legal proceedings, a Constitutional Tribunal concluded that the mine's rights to 
explore in Quilish preceded and were co-terminus with the powers of the municipality to 
declare it a protected area.  In July 2004, on the basis of this judgment and an 
environmental impact assessment, the central government gave MYSA the right to re-
commence exploration on Quilish.  Immediately, protests erupted and quickly escalated 
to the point that the city of Cajamarca and the mine were effectively paralyzed until the 
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central government once more shifted its stance.  Confronted with a situation in which its 
"social license to operate" seemed increasingly in the balance, MYSA withdrew its 
request for permission to explore in Quilish (though MYSA argues that in the future it 
may once again exercise this right).  In an effort to take advantage of the situation 
movement leaders called for the creation of a negotiating table to which they committed 
to bring forward proposals for avoiding future conflicts.  After several months, this 
demand was finally conceded, yet the movement was ultimately unable to exploit the 
opportunity it afforded.  Because of differences of opinion among civil society actors, as 
well as stalling practices by state and mine, actors could not agree on who would sit at 
this negotiating table.  Again, the movement lost the initiative. 
 
While ostensibly the protests over Cerro Quilish were over water, some 
commentators argued that underlying the intensity of feeling among many of the 
protestors was a deeper grievance - an annoyance at the arrogant behavior of the mine 
and its employees and over the increasingly conspicuous consumption associated with 
mine employment and indicative of growing inequalities within the Cajamarcan middle 
and upper-middle classes (Gorriti, 2004).  In this sense, the mobilizations brought 
together groups motivated by quite different concerns: worries over threats to rural water; 
concerns for the supply of urban water; desires to see the mine subject to national 
ownership; annoyance at the relative loss of middle and upper-middle class status and 
authority; and annoyance at the seeming impenetrability of the mine and its unwillingness 
to listen.   These positions ranged from anti-mining, to pro-mining, to commitments to 
distinct ways of governing mining.   
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As the process of social mobilization has unfolded in Cajamarca, it has incorporated a 
growing number of actors.  These actors, while united by a general sense that MYSA has 
dispossessed them of something, differ in the specific nature of their concerns.  In this 
sense, while the movement channels grievance it has not channeled any coherent, 
alternative proposal for livelihoods and territorial development, not least because the 
actors who make up the movement have quite different positions on if, and how, mining 
should proceed in the region.   
 
The existence of these internal differences has not meant that the movement has had 
no effect on the relationship between mining, livelihoods and development in Cajamarca.  
Indeed, the mine has changed some of its practices as a result of these mobilizations and 
protests.   Furthermore, it appears to have been more responsive since the movement 
"urbanized" – viewing such urbanized protest as ultimately more threatening than purely 
peasant protest.  Thus, between 1999 and 2004 MYSA's investments in environmental 
remediation almost trebled while those in social responsibility increased almost ninefold 
(Morel, 2005).23  These programs have been shown to increase the financial and human 
capital asset bases of household livelihoods, while weakening their social capital (Bury, 
2004, 2007).24  Protest has also forced some rethinking of expansion plans, as evidenced 
in the mine’s withdrawal from Quilish.  It has not, though, broken its tendency to 
combine social responsibility programs with practices of intimidation against activists 
and others who appear to stand in its way, nor has it stopped the overall expansion of the 
mine.  This expansion, which demands access to both land and water, continues to 
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transform livelihood options in the areas directly affected, primarily through its effects on 
the natural capital assets on which many livelihoods depend.  Meanwhile, and perhaps 
more importantly, the money spent by MYSA in local contracting and purchasing 
increased almost sevenfold over the same period – a direct response to urban criticisms 
that the mine operated too much as an enclave (cf. Kuramoto, 2004a, b).  This response 
increases greatly the urban stake in the continued activities of the mine. 
 
 
b) Cotacachi: articulated movement and truncated mining 
 
While in Cotacachi the initial granting of mining concessions was – as in Cajamarca - 
a process that happened off stage and in the capital city, in this case external actors 
became aware of these concessions before any significant mining development had occur  
red.  They then passed this information to local actors, and slowly a process of social 
mobilization unfolded that preceded mining activity.  Although this has ultimately proven 
to be critical in influencing subsequent territorial and livelihood dynamics in Cotacachi, it 
occurred largely by accident.  A Bay Area environmental NGO had become aware of 
Japanese mining interests in Northern Ecuador, and mentioned this to one of their 
Ecuadorian counterparts, Acción Ecológica (until recently a part of Friends of the Earth 
International).  Acción Ecológica began to pursue the case and soon made contact with 
communities in the Intag zone of Cotacachi.  They then began environmental education 
activities oriented towards making communities aware of the costs of mineral-led 
development and, indeed, towards generating strong local opposition to mining.25  At the 
 27 
same time, as in Cajamarca, a parish priest began speaking of the risks of mining in the 
area both from the pulpit and in his activities with a local youth group.  In parallel, 
though completely unrelated, a small-scale ecotourism entrepreneur and environmentalist 
had begun working with a different youth group on environmental issues (though not 
mining).  Soon, however, these three processes converged and local actors began to speak 
more explicitly about mining and the risks it would imply for environment and society in 
Intag.  Though not using a language of dispossession or colonization (cf. Harvey, 2003; 
Habermas, 1987), these groups began developing the argument that an irruption of 
mining into the area would colonize ways of life that residents had largely taken for 
granted and steadily dispossess them of a landscape, environmental quality and form of 
society that they had until then taken for-granted.  With time a hard line emerged, further 
solidified by residents' personal experiences during Acción Ecológica-sponsored visits to 
other mining sites in Ecuador and Peru, the effects of which were to create a strong anti-
mining sentiment among participants. 
 
This process led to the formation of the first explicit SMOs in Intag: DECOIN, an 
NGO that brought together the two youth groups, the priest and the ecotourism 
entrepreneur and environmentalist; and a community-based organization in the areas 
most directly affected by the mine concession.  In 1997 this committee ultimately decided 
to attack and burn down the mine camp. This event not only led Bishi Metals to 
withdraw, it also pulled both the central and local state more deeply into the conflict.  A 
ministerial visit led to a central government position that – unlike the Cajamarca case – 
did not automatically assume a pro-mine stance.  Meanwhile, the local government 
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played a role of intermediary in the conflict at the same time as it created spaces that 
ultimately allowed this incipient movement to become stronger.   
 
As in the case of the arrival of Acción Ecológica to Intag, there was an element of 
serendipity surrounding the relationship between the process of social mobilization and 
the local state.  In 1996, the national indigenous movement decided to present candidates 
for municipal elections.  On the wave of the increasing strength of the movement, and the 
increasing visibility of indigenous issues in national political debate, several of these 
candidates won mayorships.  One of these was Cotacachi,26 and the elected mayor (still in 
power in 2006) initiated a model of municipal governance that emphasized participatory 
planning and the steady incorporation of a range of social actors into municipal affairs.  A 
centerpiece of this model was the creation of the Assembly for Cantonal Unity (AUC in 
Spanish), a non-governmental counterpart of the municipality that was designed as a 
vehicle to monitor local government, foster organized links between the municipality and 
the canton's population, and host a range of social change initiatives in the canton.  One 
of these activities revolved around environmental issues, and the AUC hosted a newly 
created Committee for Environment Management (CGA in Spanish).  This space was 
partly created and then assertively taken by DECOIN and other groups in Intag.  Through 
this space they succeeded in getting Cotacachi to pass a municipal ordinance declaring 
itself an "ecological canton" that, inter alia, rejected any place for mining in territorial 
development activities.27  
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In 1996 the electoral position of the mayor of Cotacachi (Auki Tituaña) was neither 
environmental nor anti-mining.  However, by creating vehicles for organized 
participation in municipal affairs he allowed the emerging environmental movement to 
move beyond Intag and project itself canton-wide.  This in turn allowed it to develop 
links and promote its agenda with both urban and highland groups such that by 2005 
seventy-one per cent of the canton said that mining was prejudicial to nature and people, 
and only 29 per cent felt that mining should be allowed in the canton (Ospina et al, 2006).  
Just as importantly, highland indigenous organizations in the canton and the province of 
Imbabura began to offer their political support should Intag ever need it to resist the entry 
of mining.  Partly as a consequence of such changes – as well as any of his own personal 
convictions – the mayor began to assume a more clearly environmental position in 
subsequent electoral campaigns.   
 
The departure of Bishi metals in 1997, and the absence of any mining related actions 
until 2002, gave these movement organizations the chance to consolidate themselves, 
develop a series of national and international links, mobilize resources and also elaborate 
proposals for forms of rural development that would not be based on mining.  In this 
process, they were helped by the fact that Cotacachi was a nationally and internationally 
visible canton as a result of the local governance experiments underway there. These 
experiments attracted NGOs and volunteers to the canton, and so increased the 
availability of financial and technical resources.  The links to Acción Ecológica also 
helped to make the case more visible nationally and internationally (as did books 
published by local residents: Fluweger, 1998), though the lead activists in DECOIN and 
 30 
later in the AUC also dedicated considerable effort to opening up these links.  The 
willingness in later years of the mayor to publicly assume visible positions critical of 
mining, and to write directly to international groups on the same issue, also helped. 
 
These linkages served a range of specific purposes which, taken as a whole, sought to 
prevent mining from taking root in Cotacachi.  Some links were developed in order to 
pursue legal actions against mining, others to build solidarity relationships, and others to 
mobilize funds to support local development initiatives.   Indeed, both SMOs and the 
municipality invested considerable resources in this period to develop new economic 
activities in Intag, in particular organic coffee production and marketing, handicrafts, and 
community managed ecotourism.  The rationale for this work was the notion that "we are 
convinced that, if we are to block mining, we must offer practical productive alternatives 
… that generate employment."  Throughout the process – and in particular via the 
activities of the AUC – all this was combined with a sustained program of environmental 
education in schools and communities.  This time spent consolidating organizations and 
generating a more or less shared view of territorial development that was grounded in 
rural livelihoods rather than mining was something that SMOs in Cajamarca did not 
enjoy.  Thus, when in 2002 the mine concession was once again activated, and when in 
2004 it was acquired by Ascendant Copper, both SMOs and the environmental movement 
more generally were consolidated and enjoyed a far wider set of local, national and 
international linkages than they did in 1997. 
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Once Ascendant acquired the concession it sought to re-commence exploration 
activities.  As part of its entry strategy it began a program of community relations that 
sought to develop the community links on which access to the exploration site depended.  
While this generated some local support (and thus also conflict with anti-mining 
organizations and activists), the companies' own financial limitations meant that it was 
unable to operate a social investment program at anything like the level of MYSA.  Nor 
was it able to do any significant local sourcing of services or inputs.  Consequently, it has 
not yet had any significant effects on local or urban livelihoods, and there are very few 
people whose livelihood opportunities depend in any measure on the existence of the 
mine.  This has made it easier for movement organizations to keep the social movement 
and its shared environmental agenda relatively coherent and intact – as reflected in the 
figures quoted above on the level of anti-mining sentiment in the canton. 
 
This situation – along with the need for investment capital – has made it vital that 
Ascendant raise finance on the stock market (up to late 2005 its resources were limited to 
those of its Directors).  This capital is necessary not only to develop mining operations, 
but also to create the incentives that would lead at least an important part of the local 
population to see their livelihoods as depending on the mine.  To do this it began 
proceedings to get itself listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in order to sell shares.  
This elicited a response from SMOs in Cotacachi, the US, Europe and Canada that sought  
to challenge the accuracy of Ascendant's stock offering prospectus and thus prevent it 
from acquiring the approval necessary for it to be listed on the Toronto market.  While 
this effort succeeded in slowing down this approval it ultimately failed and in November 
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2005 Ascendant's first shares were sold (Ascendant Copper Corporation, 2005).  Less 
than three weeks later, members of the settlements located near to the proposed mine 
once again attacked and burnt down the mine's centre of operations (Canadian Press, 
2005; DECOIN, 2005).   
 
To date, though conflict continues, there is still no significant exploration underway.28  
In this sense movement processes have so far resisted any forms of dispossession that 
might otherwise have accompanied mining.  Mining has, however, already transformed 
Intag.  Activists and community leaders alike speak of the fact that they now have to live 
the rest of their lives knowing that there are potentially exploitable mineral resources 
under their feet, and that such exploitation may one day become a reality.  In this sense, 
the very idea of mining, and the possibility that at some future date Intag may become a 
mining district, has colonized people's lifeworlds in a way that is, to all intents and 
purposes, permanent.  Their certainties and ideas about the future will never be the same 
again. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS: CO-PRODUCTION, DISPOSSESSION AND 
MOBILIZATION 
 
Accumulation dynamics have led to the experience of dispossession in Cajamarca, 
and the threat of dispossession in Cotacachi.  In each instance, lifeworlds have been 
irrevocably changed: in Cotacachi because, with or without a mine, residents will forever 
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live with the knowledge that dramatic landscape and economic change may be just 
around the corner; and in Cajamarca, because the dispossessions and opportunities 
afforded by the mine, and the prospect of many more mines in the immediate future, have 
changed the meaning and experience of life in the region. 
 
One of the consequences of these experienced and threatened dispossessions in the 
two regions has been the emergence of social movements contesting and seeking to 
rework the lifeworld and territorial transformations associated with extractive industries.  
These movements have had clear effects on the nature of rural territorial development 
and in each case have become an important actor in the co-production of territory and 
livelihood (cf. Bebbington, 2000).  The emergence of these new actors reflects the very 
distinct projects and visions for development co-exsiting within these territories.  As such 
they constitute efforts to defend territories and pursue alternative agendas and politics in 
a way that Escobar and others have suggested lies at the core of what social movements 
are (Escobar, 1995).  The conflicts that have ensued remind us that while the co-
production of territory and livelihood might be based on synergies and complementarities 
(Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996), it is just as likely to be grounded in conflict.  The conflicts 
also make clear that any concept of co-production has also to be linked to one of power, 
for the post-1990 dynamics of co-production in Cotacachi and Cajamarca have been quite 
different, primarily because of the different power relationships between social 
movements and mining companies.  These distinct power relationships also reflect the 
quite different ways in which the local dynamics of accumulation have become part of 
national and international dynamics.    
 34 
 
The distinct trajectories of territorial change in the two cases reflect differences in the 
relative power of the mining company, the relative fragility and power of the social 
movement, and the role of government.  In both cases, the relative power of the mining 
companies is defined, obviously, by company size and the resources that it can use to 
manage and dissipate conflicts.  However, it is also the case that the resources currently 
available to MYSA for social programs are a direct effect of the growth in its operations.  
Back in 1992 MYSA had few spare resources for social investment – in that sense, at that 
time its situation was not greatly different from that of Ascendant's today.  This points to 
other important differences between the two cases: the ways in which events have been 
sequenced and the relative importance of mining in the two national economies.  MYSA's 
current power owes much to the fact that it constituted the first important foreign direct 
investment after an extended period of crisis in Peru.  This gave it singular popularity 
during its early years and allowed it to become an established local and national actor 
prior to any significant social mobilization.  This – coupled with urban and metropolitan 
indifference to the implications of the mine for rural livelihoods – meant that MYSA was 
able to initiate a process of accumulation through dispossession that subsequently 
generated the resources it later required to finance social responsibility and other 
additional expenditure needed to protect its accumulation strategy.  Furthermore, the 
importance of the mining sector within the Peruvian economy, as well as the specific 
importance of MYSA’s gold as a source of tax income and foreign currency, has meant 
that the state has rarely spoken out against MYSA or in support of social movements.  
Indeed, the last two years in Peru have seen a clear hardening of its position against 
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movements that question mining – a hardening in which state military and intelligence 
services have mobilized to resist and investigate such movements.  On those few 
occasions when parts of the state have been critical of forms of mineral expansion, such 
criticisms have come from regional politicians seeking political advantage, or from parts 
of the People's Ombudsman's office (Bebbington et al., 2007a).  Meanwhile, the financial 
support that MYSA provides to the local forces of law and order enhance its leverage 
over the state. 
 
In Cotacachi, each of these factors is distinct.  Ecuador's economy depends far more 
on hydrocarbons than minerals, Ascendant is a small junior company struggling to raise 
capital from sources other than its own Directors, and the process of social mobilization 
preceded the arrival of the company leaving a heritage of memories of successful 
resistance among the bases of the movement.  While the central state has provided strong 
support neither to company nor to movement (its messages have varied over time and 
depending on the ministry in question), the municipal government has become 
progressively more supportive of the movement's agenda.  As noted, this is partly an 
accident of history, in which a candidate of the national indigenous movement won the 
mayoralty in 1996, proved to be a skilled manager and for both personal and political 
reasons became increasingly concerned over the environment.  More importantly, this 
mayor and his commitment to participatory forms of governance allowed SMOs to 
colonize parts of the local state and to place their agenda on the municipal agenda.  At the 
same time, municipal initiatives and support have helped SMOs craft defensible 
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economic alternatives to mining.  If in Cajamarca the social movement lacks serious 
state-political patrons, in Cotacachi the mining company lacks these allies. 
 
Perhaps most critical, however, is that in Cotacachi actors within the movement have 
been able to manage internal differences and so retain a coherent, shared agenda on 
territorial development and the place of mining within it.  In the process they have been 
able to recruit progressively more support in areas not directly affected by the proposed 
mine (a process greatly assisted by their leverage within municipal government).  In 
Cajamarca this has not occurred.  The movement has been characterized by more 
struggles over leadership and by the presence of different currents with quite distinct 
views on development, politics and the place of mining in the regional economy.  Also, 
the forms of non-agrarian (largely urban) opportunity promoted by the existence of 
MYSA has meant that a large part of the urban (and significant elements within the rural) 
population are in favor of mineral-led territorial development.  The wealth of the mine 
has also meant that through its social programs and its subcontracting practices it has 
been able to cultivate support, creating a series of incentives that movement actors find 
hard to contest.  Indeed, they may often respond to these same incentives themselves as 
for instance when FEROCAFENOP accepted MYSA funding, or when staff of 
organizations critical of the mines end up accepting employment with the mine.29  
 
Transnational linkages have been of great importance for both movements.  In 
addition to the financial resources that these have made available, they have also 
facilitated access to spaces of debate with company head offices (in the case of MYSA), 
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with investors, with North American lawyers, and with broader solidarity networks.  
These contacts serve as sources of moral support and encouragement for local activists, 
and occasionally also as sources of additional human and financial resources, as well as 
vehicles for advocacy activities.  While this endorses arguments about the importance of 
transnational linkages in contemporary environmental and human rights politics (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998),30 the comparison also suggests that such transnational relations have 
not been the central factor in determining outcomes in the two cases.  They are equally 
present in the two cases, and indeed many of the networks are similar (those of Friends of 
the Earth International, Oxfam America and Bay Area environmental networks) – yet the 
outcomes in Cotacachi and Cajamarca are distinct.  The implication is that national and 
local factors, the unique political economies in which each case has unfolded, and the 
dynamics internal to local movements, each continue to be at least as important in 
determining the extent to which social movements are able to refashion patterns of 
development, and thus in determining the forms and outcomes of co-production that 
come to dominate territorial restructuring and livelihood transformation.  By the same 
token, while analytical attention to the roles played by international groups is important, 
this should not distract attention from the continuing importance of national 
environmental and human rights organizations and individuals.  In both our case studies, 
these groups and persons have provided important technical, legal and moral support to 
movement processes, have helped raise the visibility of these conflicts in national 
debates, and have provided information and training to more locally based social 
movement organizations.  While themselves often linked to international organizations, 
these actors are far more than mere appendages within transnational networks.  Their own 
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histories, agendas, relationships, capacities and positions have important effects on the 
trajectories of local conflicts over mining and development. 
 
The cases have various implications for RTD – understood as both a concept of and 
proposal for rural development.  Here we highlight three.  First, while a focus on 
territorially based dynamics is very welcome (indeed three of us are geographers), it 
must come together with a sensitivity to relationships of scale.  Territories cannot be 
understood independently of the scaled economic, political and social relations in which 
they are embedded and which, indeed, have significant influence on the very social 
processes through which a particular territory is constituted.  Second, while the focus on 
institutional transformation is also welcome, it is important to avoid using a language of 
institutions as a way of eliding attention to politics and relationships of power.  These 
cases make clear just how contested rural development is, and how far power 
relationships influence the models of development that ultimately rise to ascendancy.  
Third, it is critical not to speak of development in the singular.  The cases make evident 
the sense in which – within a territory – competing models and concepts of development 
coexist in relations sometimes of conflict, sometimes of synergy.  Indeed, one of the 
lessons from such conflictive cases as these is that a viable RTD is likely to be one that is 
able to accommodate a range of quite distinct visions and one that builds the social 
relationships and institutions that are necessary for mediating the conflicts that will 
inevitably arise among these distinct visions.  
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We close by returning to our opening reflection on livelihoods, RTD and social 
movements.  The analysis here makes clear that the institutions, structures and discourses 
that govern asset distribution, security and productivity are not pre-given.  They are 
struggled over, re-worked and co-produced through the actions and interactions of a 
range of market, state and civil society actors.  While new forms of capital investment 
and market integration are particularly influential in these processes of co-production, our 
cases make clear that social movements also co-determine the forms taken by the 
institutions, structures and discourses that structure RTD and livelihoods.  These 
movements have forced debate on the desirability of mineral led forms of rural 
development and the institutional and livelihood changes that these would necessarily 
require; they have struggled to protect certain institutions while challenging others; and 
they have elicited changes in accumulation dynamics and processes of dispossession.  
Their emergence embodies the existence of subaltern and contentious views on rural 
development, and modifies the material nature and meanings associated with the forms of 
rural development that ultimately unfold.  It therefore behooves analysts and activists 
alike to understand how the presence (and absence) of movements affects – and will 
affect - the new territorial dynamics currently unfolding in Latin America. 
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2
 These are the departments of Cajamarca, Cusco and Huancavelica.  Peru is divided administratively into 
departments (now referred to as regions) which are in turn subdivided into provinces, districts and yet more 
local level administrations.  Ecuador is divided administratively into provinces, which are in turn 
subdivided into cantons which in turn are composed of parishes.  
 
3
 RTD will, for instance, feature in the in World Bank's 2008 World Development Report on agriculture, 
occupies a central place in the Inter-American Development Bank's current rural development policy and 
strategy, and is prominent in discussions in IFAD. 
 
4
 Many phenomena might fall under this category of institutions, some more formal, others more social and 
relational.  The former might include land tenure rules, subsoil ownership rights, environmental regulation 
standards, rules governing access to and provision of health care and education etc.  The latter (which 
interact with the former) may include relationships of race, ethnicity, gender, region and class that also 
have significant implications for access, control, security, use and reproduction of resources.   
 
5
  For the specific case of the Peruvian Andes, Gavin Smith has explored in dense ethnographic and 
historical detail the many ways in which resistance and livelihood are linked (Smith, 1989).  For a slightly 
more general discussion of this link see Bebbington, 2004. 
 
6
 In Peru, Long and Roberts (1984) also dealt with such labor disputes in the central highlands. 
 
7
 BBC, 2006. "Chile copper miners' strike ends"  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5304404.stm.  
Accessed on September 1st, 2006. 
 
8
 This point needs some qualification, however, because during 2007 in Peru, mine worker union conflicts 
became more frequent and in at least one instance national strike action was called for.  However, it may 
also be that this spurt in militancy occurred as unions took advantage of – or became part of – the more 
general increase in national concern about the extraordinary profits being made by mining companies as a 
result of mineral price rises.  
 
9
 A further technical change in the high Andes is the "mineral duct," a mining version of oil and gas 
pipelines.   These ducts run from the high altitude mine site down to the coast to ore-treatment plants and 
ports from which the ore is exported.  This is the case, for instance, in the Antamina mine in Peru, which 
Bridge's survey (2004: 413) concludes was the world's single largest mine investment between 1990 and 
2001.  Here a duct runs 302 km to the coast (http://www.antamina.com/02_operacion/En_concen_03.html).  
A similar duct has also been discussed for the very contentious Majaz/Rio Blanco project in Piura (see 
Bebbington et al., 2007).  These ducts run through farmed land and can trigger other conflicts along their 
course. 
 
10
 In those instances where mineral expansion threatens water sources for downstream populations. 
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11
 These communities are generally not as strong as those in the Central and Southern Andes of Peru.  Also 
their members are Spanish-speaking and tend to identify themselves as “campesino” rather than 
“indigenous” (Chacón Pagán, 2004: 363). 
 
12
 This is for its acronym in Spanish, Minera Yanacocha Sociedad Anónima.   
 
13
 El Comercio, 29th August, 2006 page B1. 
 
14
 Its main office is, however, located in Lakewood, Colorado 
 
15
 Albeit much more so in the case of Cajamarca than that of Cotacachi. 
 
16
 Again, for reasons of transparency it must be noted that some of this interaction derived from this study.  
However, there had already been exchanges between the two cases. 
 
17
 In addition it owns 1386km2 of mineral rights, and has explicit plans to continue expanding.  Data are 
from Bury (2005), Yanacocha (2005) and www.yanacocha.com.pe 
 
18
 Especially the now-defunct Project Underground (2003, 1999). 
 
19
 Though at one point, there appears to have been a plan to attack the mine site – Project Underground 
dissuaded the federation from pursuing this option. 
 
20
 We remain unable to explain how this occurred.  It is a case so full of mutual recriminations that it is 
difficult to know what actually happened.  What is clear is (i) that the mine had already invested (through 
its hiring practices) in finding ways into social movement organizations and (ii) that at least some of the 
leaders of the federation were always more of a mind to ensure adequate community compensation for the 
mine rather than the closure of the mine.  These two postures certainly helped make this financial flow 
possible. 
21
 Even more forgiving studies, in part supported by MYSA, viewed the mine as something of an enclave 
(Kuramoto, 2004a,b; see also Dirven, 2006). 
 
22
  Chacón (2004: 3) puts it far more forcefully and cynically. Speaking of protests in Bambamarca, a 
community near Cajamarca, and the Choropampa protest itself, he states (our translation): “in general, the 
terms of debate are defined by the latter, specifically provincial political authorities and intellectuals, while 
the former, above all the rondas campesinas, sound the initial bell, and then serve as the sacrificial lamb."  
 
23
 However, MYSA profits also grew significantly over the same period. 
 
24
 Bury draws particular attention to the weakening of community based organizations and of household 
social networks and relationships of trust. 
 
25
 Acción Ecológica is opposed to mineral development in Ecuador. 
 
26
 Another was Guamote, discussed in Bebbington, 2000. 
 
27
 See Municipalidad de Santa Ana de Cotacachi, 2000. 
 
28
 In September 2007, the Ministry of Energy and Mines required Ascendant to suspend all its activities on 
the grounds that it did not have the support of the Municipality of Cotacachi.  This does not suspend the 
concession, and the Minister left open the possibility that the company could return if it could reach a 
negotiated agreement to do so with the communities and local government.  However, this decision can be 
seen as a further "win" for the social movement in Cotacachi. 
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29
 For instance, a member of Grufides in Cajamarca went to work for MYSA's social development program 
in 2005. 
 
30
 As well as the efforts of transnational activists. 
